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**TOPIC: BETWEEN “CHOOSING” AND “WILLING” IN  
CONCEIVING AUTONOMY? NO, WE DO BOTH**

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AUTONOMY? NO, WE DO BOTH**

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**Abstract**

Choice is arguably one of the most treasured acts in liberal principles. Intrinsically and instrumentally, it shapes our idea about autonomy in significant ways. Autonomy is valued because partly because it is the manifestation of having free choice. Autonomy often suggests they are always a range of things to choose from, and that our choosing is decided by virtues of our desire or conscience. But how *autonomous* is our free choice is not easy to say because, sometimes, having choices do not make us feel any freer. In one hand, consider the case when we are going to a shopping mall and not knowing to buy anything just because there are too many things to choose. On the other, the very thing that we desire is simply there, standing in solitary, and we know it that it is *the one*. Therefore, in which case we are more autonomous to choose? In both cases, I would argue. This essay is about the dual facets of choice and their influences on our notion regarding our conflicting notion of choice. I argue that choice has two essential aspects: the comparative aspect and the categorical aspect, the qualities of which we balance depending on our particularly *situated* practical constraints and value-judgment - it is knowing the boundary of these aspects, and acting within the boundary, which give us satisfactions in our choice which result in the thinking that our choice is indeed "autonomous."

Keywords/themes: choice, autonomy, conception of preferences, conception of freedom