Information asymmetry and financing decisions

Su, Hui Ling (2012) Information asymmetry and financing decisions. [Final Year Project Report] (Unpublished)

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This study explores the relationship between information asymmetry and financing decisions of firms. The sample data includes 598 public-listed firms in Bursa Malaysia, over the sample period from 2005 until 2010. This study relies on firm-level of information, focusing in business context. Information asymmetry is defined as the imbalance amount of information gained between the insiders' management and the outsiders' investor. This study concludes that firms' size, corporate leverage and financial slack could influence the level of information gained among parties. The result and findings in this study shows that total assets has the strongest relationship with the information asymm~try. In addition, total assets could represent internal financing of a firm. The relationship is then followed by financial slack and corporate leverage, respectively. These findings are somehow consistent with the assumption of pecking order theory, showing the preference of firm in deciding to apply internal financing.

Item Type: Final Year Project Report
Additional Information: Project Report (B.Sc.) -- Universiti Malaysia Sarawak, 2012.
Uncontrolled Keywords: Information asymmetry, Financing decisions, unimas, university, universiti, Borneo, Malaysia, Sarawak, Kuching, Samarahan, ipta, education, Postgraduate, research, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Divisions: Academic Faculties, Institutes and Centres > Faculty of Economics and Business
Faculties, Institutes, Centres > Faculty of Economics and Business
Depositing User: Karen Kornalius
Date Deposited: 13 Jan 2016 08:05
Last Modified: 08 Feb 2024 03:52

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